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RES JUDICATA AND PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF
INVOKING A FEDERAL COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION TO SAVE "STATE" COURT CLAIMS
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: A BRIGHT LINE
TEST
Stephen Giunta
L

PRECIS OF ThE CASE

In Gilles v. Ware,1 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted the rule
that the plaintiff has the burden of invoking a federal court's supplemental
jurisdiction2 to defend against a res judicata defense in a later state court
proceeding. 4 Judge John M. Ferren concluded that a District of Columbia plaintiff
must affirmatively demand a federal court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
over pendent state claims. If the plaintiff fails to do this, defendant will prevail in
later state court claims arising from the same factual circumstances by the
doctrine of res judicata.
Judge Ferren, however, did not persuade his colleaguesO to remand the case to
determine whether defendant had waived his/her right to a res judicata defense
by implicitly consenting to plaintiffs claim splitting.0 Rather, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment.7 The Court held that a plaintiff must invoke or
otherwise formally request a federal court to adjudicate state court claims arising
from the same cause of action as the federal question claims.'

1. 615 A.2d 533 (D.C. 1992).
2. Supplemental jurisdiction is synonymous with pendent jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990).
3. State court claims refer to District of Columbia Superior Court claims.
4. See Habib v. Keats, 286 A.2d 854 (D.C. 1972) and Gullo v. Hirst, 207 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1965) for a
cursory treatment of res judicata barring claims previously brought in Maryland and Virginia respectively.
Otherwise, this issue is one of first impression.
5. Judge Annice M. Wagner and Judge Gerard D. Reilly.
6. Claim splitting is the division of two or more causes of action resulting from the original cause of
action or transaction. See Tuttle v. Everhot Heater Co., 264 Mich. 60. 64. 249 N.W. 467, 469 (1933).
7 Gilles. 615 A.2d at 536.
8. Id. at 540.28 U.S.C § 1331 (1980) confers federal question jurisdiction on federal district courts.
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IL

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In April of 1984, the Bureau of Motor Vehicle Services (BMVS) of the District
of Columbia erroneously placed 44 points on the license of Gerald J. Gilles, a taxi
cab driver.9 BMVS revoked Gilles' driver's license a month later on May 18th
based on this error.10 BMVS, however, issued a restricted license so that Gilles
could work from nine a.m. to seven p.m. Monday through Saturday."1 Gilles did
not appeal this license revocation and only sought to change it a year later by
having his attorney write to the Administrator of the Transportation Systems
Administration.1 2 In June of 1985, the Administrator voided Gilles' revocation. 8
By August 1985, BMVS removed the 44 points from Gilles' driver's license. 4

IL. PROCEDURAL IhSTORY
In July of 1985, Gilles filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia against various D.C. officials"0 alleging constitutional
deprivations, libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence.10 In
December of 1985, Gilles amended his complaint to exclude the claims for libel,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence.1 7 Gilles thereby
amended his complaint to exclude his request for supplemental jurisdiction over
these claims by the federal district court.1 8
Gilles argued that the BMVS' mistaken placement of points violated his Fifth

9. Id. at 535.
10. See Gilles v. Touchstone, 676 F. Supp. 341, 342 (D.D.C. 1987). The Hacker's License Appeal
Board also revoked Gilles' Hacker's License in a separate proceeding due to this error. Touchstone at 343. See
also, Gilles v. Hacker's Appeal Comm'n, No. 84-647 (1984).
11. Gilles, 615 A.2d at 535.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 536.
14. Id.
15. The defendants were the District of Columbia; Mayor Marion Barry; the Director of the
Department of Public Works, John D. Touchstone; Administrator of the Transportation Systems
Administration, Robert Thompson; an employee of the Public Vehicles Department, Donald Anderson; the
Director of the Bureau of Traffic Adjudication. James McWilliams and the Chairman of the Hacker's License
Appeal Board, Stanley Foshee. Touchstone, 676 F. Supp. at 343 n.4.
16. Gilles, 615 A.2d at 536.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Amendment right to due process.10 Gilles asserted that he has a property interest
in an accurate driver's license.2 0 The BMVS unlawfully deprived Gilles of this
interest by mistakenly placing points on his license. 1 This action resulted in
administrative difficulties, thereby diminishing Gilles' ability to maintain gainful
employment.
Gilles further alleged that the mistaken points placed on his license resulted in
the loss of his Hacker's License and the denial of his application for United States
citizenship. 22 . By November 1987, the federal district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment determining that Gilles had no legitimate claim
and that no question of material fact existed. 3 The district court reasoned that
due process is not violated when a state employee acts negligently if the state
provides an adequate administrative remedy.24
Two years later in April 1987, Gilles sued Clifton Ware in D.C. Superior
Court. 25 He alleged damages based on the mistaken placement of points on his
record Gilles alleged that the BMVS' negligence resulted in violations of his due
process and civil rights.2 7 In November of 1989, the District of Columbia Superior
Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment."a The court concluded
that Gilles' prior federal suit prevented further litigation of any claims derived
20
from the mistaken placement of the 44 points on his driver's license.

19. Touchstone, 676 F. Supp. at 344.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The Court did not explain Gillese assertion that the revocation of his driver's license resulted in
the denial of his application for U-S. citizenship in March 1985.
23. Id.
24. Touchstone, 676 F. Supp. 341, 342. "[Als long as the state provides an adequate state remedy to
redress and compensate individuals deprived of property by state employees acting under the color of state
law, due process is satisfied." Citing, Parratt v. Taylor. 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908. (1981). The U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia further stated that under applicable D.C. law, the remedy for such
negligent conduct is adequate, as Gilles could have appealed this revocation to the BMVS Director. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-632 (1981). Touchstone, 676 F. Supp. at 344-45.
25. Gilles, 615 A.2d at 536. Mr. Ware supervised the BMVS office
where the 44 points were entered on
Gilles' driver's license. See also Touchstone, 676 F. Supp. at 344.
26. Gilles, 615 a.2d at 536.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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IV.

LEGAL REASONING ANb ANALYSIS

A. Adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Section 25 (1982)
1. The Court Rejected Gilles' Argument That The Discretionary Nature of
Supplemental Jurisdiction Removes Plaintiffs Burden of Invoking It
On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Gilles argued that the
uncertainty of a federal court's use of supplemental jurisdiction obviated his
obligation of testing it. 30 Gilles argued that this uncertainty is based on the
discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction. 81 The Court rejected this
argument finding this approach "unworkable because it [was] based on pure
speculation." ' 2 Federal courts are not required to dismiss pendent state claims if a
federal cause of action is dismissed.33
A plaintiff pleading before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals who had
previously sued in federal court on the same subject matter must demand that the
federal court exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Otherwise, plaintiff is precluded
by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing later claims arising from the same
factual circumstances.
The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco
Chemicals Corp.3 4 which rejected the same argument made by Gilles that the
tenuous nature of supplemental jurisdiction removes plaintiff's obligation to
request it.35 Plaintiff Harper Plastics appealed a U.S. District Court injunction
which forbade Harper Plastics from bringing a breach of contract action in Illinois
State court.38 Harper Plastics unsuccessfully sued several companies for antitrust
violations.3 " The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the injunction.3"
The Seventh Circuit rejected Harper Plastics' argument that the uncertainty of
30. Id. at 539.
31. Gilles, 615 A.2d at 539.
32. Id. at 541.
33. Id.
34. 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981).
35. Gilles, 615 A.2d at 540.
36. Harper Plastics, Inc., 657 F.2d at 940. The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois issued the injunction.
37. Id. at 942. Plaintiff Harper Plastics alleged that Amoco Chemical Corp. and other defendants
conspired to illegally obstruct the sale of plastic goods to plaintiff, violating 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1936).
38. Id. at 945.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

393

a district court's granting of supplemental jurisdiction removed plaintiff's burden
of invoking it.
We fail to discern the unfairness in requiring a plaintiff to join all relevant
theories of relief in a single proceeding. The uncertainty over whether a trial
judge would exercise pendelit jurisdiction does not justify permitting the
institution of a multiplicity of proceedings which may have the effect of
harassing defendants and wasting judicial resources.30
In Gilles the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed with the Seventh
Circuit. The Court stated that the tenuous nature of supplemental jurisdiction
requires that a plaintiff invoke it to assure judicial efficiency.' 0 By dismissing
Gilles' argument, the Court adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
Section 25 (1982) which reads:
The rule of Section 2441 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against
the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action:
(1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented
in the first action; or
(2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.
More specifically, the Court adopted one interpretation of comment e of Section
25 which reads:
A given claim may find support in theories or grounds arising from both state
and federal law. When the plaintiff brings an action on the claim in court,
either state or federal, in which there is no jurisdictional obstacle to his
advancing both theories or grounds, but he presents only one of them, and
judgment is entered with respect to it, he may not maintain a second action in
which he tenders the other theory or ground. If. however, the court in thefirst

action would clearly not have had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory

39. Id. at 946.
40. Gilles, 615 A.2d at 540-1.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) reads:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs claim pursuant to the
rule of merger or bar (see §§ 18. 19). the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out
of which the action arose.
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or ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to exercise it
as a matter of discretion), then the second action in a competent court
presenting the omitted theory or ground should be held not precluded.
[Emphasis is added.]
2. The Court Rejected Gilles' Argument That A Verdict of Summary
Judgment Clearly Shows That The Federal Court Would Have Declined
Supplemental Jurisdiction.
Gilles alternatively argued that a verdict of summary judgment demonstrates
that the federal court "clearly" would have declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction comporting with comment e. 42 Thus, summary judgment infers that
the court would not have exercised pendent jurisdiction. 4 - Although this
interpretation has a basis in persuasive authority, 4 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals rejected this approach. The Court concluded that such an
interpretation is "based on pure speculation.""' Under this framework, plaintiffs
could argue that summary judgment, by itself, would preclude res judicata
46
effect.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals followed other jurisdictions 47 by
requiring plaintiffs to plead all claims in the initial suit. Judicial efficiency posits
that plaintiffs seek all claims and remedies at the time of the initial litigation. This
concern is the guiding motivation in adopting this interpretation of comment e.
Excluding state claims when a federal court could have disposed of them will
necessarily preclude subsequent claims before state fora. 4 8

42. Gilles. 615 A.2d at 541.
43. Id.
44. See Merry v. Coast Community College Dist., 97 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 214, 228. 158 Cal. Rptr. 603,
612 (1979) stated. "a refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state claim following pretrial dismissal or
a federal claim does not bar litigation of state claims in state court." See also, Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo,
Inc. v. Wakehouse Motors, Inc.. 46 Or. App. 199, 206, 611 P.2d 658, 662 (1980) which stated, "the prior
federal court action [granting defendant's motion for summary judgment] did not bar, on res Judicata
grounds, plaintiff's right to maintain the present action."
45. Gilles. 615 A.2d at 541.
46. Id.
47. In Anderson v. Phoenix Inv. Counsel of Boston, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 1164, 1169 (Mass. 1982), the
Massachusetts' Supreme Court stated, *'We cannot countenance a plaintiff's action in failing to plead a theory
in a federal court with the hope of later litigating the theory in State court because it was possible, or even
probable, that the Federal court would have declined to exercise its pendent jurisdiction."
48. The D.C. Court of Appeals stated. "'We therefore recognize the rule that, when a plaintiff has an
apparent right to invoke a federal court's pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim, the plaintiff is obliged to
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Additionally, the Court properly concluded that Gilles' argument was logically
inconsistent. Gilles could not demonstrate why an order granting summary
judgment "clearly" showed that a federal court would have declined supplemental
jurisdiction over the state claims. Gilles committed the material fallacy (or
illogical argument) referred to as post hoc ergo propter hoc, which ascribes an
erroneous cause to a subsequent effect or result.' Gilles could not show how an
order granting summary judgment proved that a court would have declined
supplemental jurisdiction. Gilles argued that the D.C. Court of Appeals' grant of a
motion for summary judgment proves or resulted from the federal court's refusal
to assume pendent jurisdiction. He demonstrated no causal-effect relationship nor
offered any supporting evidence despite asserting the contrary. Indeed, it is unclear
whether the order for summary judgment preceded the refusal to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
B. Rejecting RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

Section 26 (1982)

The Court, however, did not adopt RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
Section 26 (1982)50 which allows plaintiff to proceed with subsequent claims in
other fora if the defendant explicitly or implicitly agrees to claim splitting. Judge
Ferren concluded that the trial court did not properly determine if defendant Ware
had acquiesced or consented to Gilles' claim splitting. 1 He would have remanded
the case to determine this issue.52 As the order for summary judgment did not
resolve whether defendant had consented to plaintiff's claim splitting, Judge
Ferren concluded

that adopting

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

JUDGMENTS

Section 26 (1982) would clarify such issues in the future.
Judge Wagner and Judge Reilly, concurring on this issue, disagreed with Judge

file the pendent claim and force the federal court to exercise its discretion to keep or decline juritdiction;
otherwise, the plaintiff will confront a res judicata bar of the state claim in a subsequent state court
proceeding." Gilles, 615 A.2d at 540.
49. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT. LOGIC FOR LAWYERS 193 (1989).
50. This section states in pertinent part:
(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule of § 24 does not apply to extinguish
the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff
against the defendant:
(a) The parties have agreed in terms or in effect that the plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant
has acquiesced therein.
51. Gilles. 615 A.2d at 543-4.
52. Id. at 535.

396

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Ferren finding that no issue of consent existed based on the factual record. 8
Defendant properly objected to defending two law suits.5 Judge Wagner, after
reviewing the record, concluded that defendant Ware did object to Gilles' second
suit by filing a stay in D.C. Superior Court. 55 Ware also filed an answer (after the
stay was lifted) raising a res judicata defense. This timely objection, therefore,
prevented plaintiff from defeating a res judicata defense. Judges Wagner and
Reilly did not dispute the legitimacy or practicality of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS Section 26 (1982).8 0 They, however, concluded that it did not apply in
this instance."7 Therefore, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the
order for summary judgment for defendant Ware. 5a

V.

CONCLUSION

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted the rule that plaintiff must
invoke a federal court's supplemental jurisdiction to prevail over a defense of res
judicata in later state court claims. This rule will clarify plaintiff's burden when
litigating various theories before a federal forum. It will also assure defendants
that later suits will fail if supplemental jurisdiction has not been invoked by
plaintiffs during the initial litigation.
Gilles v. Ware clarified District of Columbia law by placing a reasonable burden
on plaintiffs when litigating several causes of action before federal courts. This
bright line test will assure judicial efficiency by requiring plaintiffs to demand a
federal court's supplemental jurisdiction to save later state court claims before
District of Columbia trial courts. An absolute bar on subsequent claims under
these circumstances can only diminish docket crowding.5 9 Judicial resources are
therefore preserved by requiring plaintiffs to pursue all claims at the start of
litigation. Subsequent suits are unavailable to unsuccessful defendants.
Judge Ferren did not persuade his colleagues to adopt RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS Section 26 (1982) which would allow later state court claims if
plaintiff could prove that defendant consented or acquiesced to plaintiff's claim

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 547, 554.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 536, 549.
Gilles, 615 A.2d. at 545.
Id. at 554.
Id.
To what degree is another question.
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splitting.80 Judges Wagner and Reilly concluded that Ware had objected to Gilles'
second suit before the D.C. Superior Court."1 Therefore, remanding the case to
determine this factual issue was unnecessary, thus obviating the opportunity to
adopt this rule. It is unfortunate that Mr. Gilles could not redress this error.
However, this is due to his own delay and not short-sightedness of the Court.

60. Gilles, 615 A.2d at 554.
61. Id. at 548.

